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Abstract 
 
Biomedical advances nowadays enable physicians to keep patients hovering at the brink of death 
for many years. These new technologies have evoked challenging ethical dilemmas that test 
society’s moral resources. But some have been unwilling to patiently search for new moral 
wisdom, believing a bold stance is required and they are using legal means to achieve their goal. 
Attempts to legalize physician assisted suicide and euthanasia are one example, and the literature 
is replete with analyses of these practices. Far less attention has been paid to opposite attempts at 
legally enforcing life-sustaining medical interventions. In the mid 1990s, a group called 
"Nebraskans for Humane Care" sought to amend the Nebraska Constitution to require that 
nutrition and hydration is administered to any person and with any means available.  In this 
article, the history behind and the text of the proposed amendment is critically analyzed, revealing 
the serious consequences that adoption of such legal regulation of medical treatment can have. 
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Pitfalls of Legal Regulations to Improve End-of-Life Care 
 
Never before in the history of mankind have advanced societies been able to keep 
people hovering at the brink of death for many years, even decades, unable to sustain 
themselves, kept alive only by advanced medical technologies. These new technologies have 
evoked very complex and challenging ethical dilemmas that test society’s moral resources. 
With it, the ethical question has arisen whether the fact that one can do so, also means that 
one morally must do so. This is a most challenging ethical question, which has put society’s 
moral resources to the test. Thus, many contemporary patients, their physicians, family 
members and care givers are searching for moral truth, planning, pondering, and praying.  
But some have been unwilling to seek patiently, believing a bold stance is required.  
There are those who argue that physicians, having created the problem of patients hovering 
between life and death, should provide patients with an expedient way out, either by assisting 
in patients’ suicides or by assuming final responsibility and actually ending patients’ lives. 
The states of Oregon and Washington have legalized physician assisted suicide (PAS), 
Belgium legalized euthanasia, and the Netherlands decriminalized both. Then there are those 
who believe this answer is contrary to the fundamental dignity and sacredness of human life.  
They do not believe human life is ever not worth living, shun discussions about forgoing life-
sustaining medical treatments, and have, likewise, resorted to the law to propel their 
perspective. In the case of Terri Schiavo, her parents managed to continue the provision of 
medically administered nutrition and hydration for approximately seven years by fighting its 
withdrawal in court (Cerminara & Goodman, 2006). In the second half of this decade, a 
group called “Nebraskans for Humane Care Committee” sought to amend the constitution of 
the State of Nebraska, requiring, by force of law, that nutrition and hydration in principle is 
administered to any person and with any means available. 
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This article reviews the Nebraska proposal, submitting both the text of the amendment 
and the political process that surrounded this event to close scrutiny.  This amendment was 
admittedly a rather local initiative, concerning only the 1.7 million inhabitants of the State of 
Nebraska. Moreover, in the end, it did not become positive law.  However, the ethical 
discussion of that initiative serves two larger purposes. First, the examination of the 
amendment text itself shows that it is truly difficult to write good laws about end-of-life 
medical care. Although this author – and everybody else known to this author – has failed to 
gain first-hand insight in the intentions of the individuals who wrote this particular 
amendment, for they have steadfastly refused to answer all inquiries, there is no reason to 
believe that they intended the potential harms entailed in this amendment. Instead, these 
dangers are largely the result of the limitations of the legislative endeavor itself.   
Second, this review of the legislative process will show that this amendment was not a 
peculiarly Nebraskan idiosyncrasy. Instead, it appears that Nebraska was simply a testing 
ground for a political experiment, conceived of and operationalized by individuals and 
agencies, none of which were Nebraskan.  The analysis serves to underscore the more general 
caveat against relying on legal means to resolve urgent and complex medical-ethical 
quandaries, such as those evoked by emerging medical treatments and life-sustaining 
technologies. 
As mentioned, the proponents of this Nebraskan initiative refused to engage in public 
or private discussions about the proposed amendment.  Consequently, the analyses of this 
HCA presented here are inevitably biased by the perspectives that have been voiced in a 
variety of media by opponents of the amendment.  The virtual absence of public comments 
and explanations by those individuals who have first-hand knowledge about this initiative has 
also rendered it difficult to provide a complete and verifiable rendering of the facts. 
The 2006 Petition Drive 
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In the summer of 2006, a large number of signature collectors went in search of 
registered voters who might be willing to support a proposal to amend the Constitution of the 
State of Nebraska. Specifically, the amendment would add a new section 30 entitled 
“Humane Care.”  The goal was to collect sufficient signatures to have the Humane Care 
Amendment (HCA) included on the ballot for the elections slated for November of that same 
year.  
The HCA’s full title, “To Amend Article I of the Constitution of Nebraska by adding 
a new section 30: Humane Care,” probably sufficed to sway a good number of Nebraskans. 
After all, who is against humane care? It is unknown what additional explanation the 
signature collectors would give next to persuade the hesitant citizen. However, the text of the 
official “object clause” that was printed right below the amendment’s title is as follows: 
This measure would humanely protect any person, regardless of race, religion 
or ethnicity, age, disability or gender, from the withholding of food or water 
by any institution with a legal duty of care (such as a hospital, orphanage, 
prison or nursing home) if the withholding of that nourishment could 
reasonably result in death from dehydration or starvation. This measure allows 
for honoring the will of any person who has expressly requested withholding 
food and water under specific conditions or delegated to relatives that 
decision, by means of a valid advance directive given previous. (Nebraskans 
for Humane Care Committee 2006b) 
 
The object clause contains two sentences. The first describes what the amendment 
would require if accepted. When reduced to its essence, this sentence reads: “This measure 
would humanely protect any person .... from the withholding of food or water .... if the 
withholding ... could reasonably result in death from dehydration or starvation.” 
The supposed “humaneness” of the amendment is underscored once more by the 
fourth word, immediately followed by the claim that the amendment actually “protects” 
people from some sort of harm.  The harm turns out to be a deprivation (“withholding”) of a 
good, indeed a very basic good (i.e., food and water).  Apparently – for otherwise there 
would not have been a need to amend the Constitution – health care providers in the State of 
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Nebraska so often deprive patients from these basic goods that a most forceful measure is in 
order, that is, a constitutional amendment. Fear is sown. The sentence ends by adding more 
fuel to the flame: If the petition fails, people may end up dying “from dehydration or 
starvation.”  The same frightening language (and worse) surfaced on the website of the 
Nebraskans for Humane Care Committee (NHCC) which sponsored the amendment 
(Nebraskans for Humane Care Committee 2006b). 
The second sentence of the object clause, in contrast, appeals to the value of 
individual freedom of choice, a building block of American culture that is particularly dear to 
many citizens of the State of Nebraska. The object clause assures those voters who are 
suspicious of any government interference with their own health care that their choices will 
be respected, including a refusal of food and water. 
The combination of the title, object clause, and any explanation added by the 
signature collectors themselves is likely to have been sufficient to persuade most of the 
137,000 signatories.  Few people would have read the full text of the HCA, which is a dense 
and potentially confounding piece of legal writing: 
The fundamental human right to food and water should not be denied to any 
person, regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, nativity, disability, age, state of 
health, gender or other characteristic: No entity with a legal duty of care for a 
person within its custody (including a hospital, orphanage, foster home, 
nursing home, sanitarium, skilled nursing facility, prison, jail, detainment 
center, corporation, business, institution or individual) may refuse, deny, or 
fail to provide food and water sustenance and nourishment, however delivered, 
to any such person if death or grave physical harm could reasonably result 
from such withholding and the person at risk can metabolize. Any such person 
so threatened with dehydration or starvation, any relative of such person, such 
person’s legal guardian or surrogate, any public official with appropriate 
jurisdiction, or any protection and advocacy or ombudsman agency shall have 
legal standing to bring an action for injunctive relief, damages and reasonable 
attorney’s fees to uphold this standard of humane care. This section does not 
prohibit honoring the will of any person who, by means of a valid advance 
directive record, has fully, expressly, and personally either authorized the 
withholding of food or water from himself or herself under specific conditions, 
or delegated that decision, under specific conditions, to one or more relatives 
or to another person unrelated to the entity with a legal duty of care. 
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What is worse, the actual amendment does not quite live up to the assurances included 
in the object clause. As will be shown shortly, instead of the benefits guaranteed by the first 
sentence of the object clause, the text of the amendment actually entails many harms. And the 
respect for patient’s autonomy promised in the second sentence is severely restricted by the 
amendment itself.  And yet it is the amendment, not the object clause, that would have 
become law if adopted.  
Ethical Analysis of the Proposed Amendment 
The 226 word HCA consists of three sentences only, each delineating a distinct part 
of the HCA.  The first part describes the specific behavior that is to be prohibited.  The 
second part enumerates who has the power to seek enforcement of that prohibition. And the 
third part lists some exceptions to the prohibition.  This analysis commences with Part 2 
because it is largely procedural in nature and, as such, the least controversial of the three. 
Subsequently, Part 1 will be examined, which is ethically the most problematic. Finally, it 
will be shown that patients’ freedom of choice ultimately is much more limited than Part 3 
appears to promise.  
Part 2: Legal Force 
The middle sentence of the HCA in essence outlines who is authorized to take legal 
action to enforce the proscribed behavior, or to seek damages if it has been violated: 
Any such person so threatened with dehydration or starvation, any relative of 
such person, such person’s legal guardian or surrogate, any public official with 
appropriate jurisdiction, or any protection and advocacy or ombudsman 
agency shall have legal standing to bring an action for injunctive relief, 
damages and reasonable attorney’s fees to uphold this standard of humane 
care.  
 
Expectedly, the first person included in this list is the patient. It is equally reasonable 
to include in this list “such person’s legal guardian or surrogate,” in case the patient has 
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become incompetent and is no longer able to protect his or her rights. Whereas this legal 
representative could be a family member, it does not have to be one.  
But the amendment actually allows any patient relative to act as a self-appointed 
advocate. This is consistent with the absence in Nebraska end-of-care law of a so-called 
“familial consent” statute that would have regulated the order in which relatives may decide 
on behalf of incompetent family members in the absence of a legally appointed surrogate.  At 
odds with Nebraska law, however, is the HCA’s allowing such a relative, even a very distant 
one, to intervene while the patient is still perfectly competent to make health care decisions. 
Or if the patient has become incompetent, this relative may come forward to contradict the 
patient’s legally appointed surrogate. The fact that any relative of such person is so 
authorized can easily result in a single relative upsetting a carefully negotiated palliative care 
plan for grandmother, even if it happens to be a distant cousin with an ax to grind against one 
of the other family members, or the estranged son who now converts his deep sense of guilt 
into a dramatic demand that every life-sustaining treatment is tried.  This increases the chance 
of family in-fighting and communication breakdowns, already a prevalent problem in end-of-
life care planning (Lang & Quill, 2004; Swetz, Crowley, Hook & Mueller, 2007; Winter & 
Parks, 2008). 
To this already expansive list of authorized individuals are added three groups of 
“third persons.” Mentioned first is (a) “any public official with appropriate jurisdiction”.  The 
state most certainly has a justifiable interest in human life and must pay particular attention to 
the protection of vulnerable individuals who are unable to safeguard their own rights. 
Unfortunately, there are also ample examples of state officials, such as attorneys general, 
having intervened in the decision-making processes surrounding patients’ end-of-life care, 
insisting on the continued artificial nutrition and hydration (AN&H) regardless whether such 
continuation was medically indicated or even if it caused the patient “grotesque harm” 
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according to the physicians involved, as happened in the case of Sheila Pouliot (Ouellette, 
2004).  
Whereas the first category of individuals empowered by the HCA to intervene is 
restricted by the limiting clause “with appropriate jurisdiction,” the second and third 
categories are very broadly defined, giving license to (b) any protection and advocacy agency 
and (c) any ombudsman agency.  Because the HCA does not define what justifies such a 
label, a small group of vitalist crusaders that calls itself a protection agency could qualify or 
even the company that manufactures the machinery for artificial nutrition could qualify when 
it presents itself as an advocacy agency.  
Part 2 is also problematic for a very different reason, that is, the language used. The 
HCA references the person “so threatened with dehydration or starvation.”  As pointed out 
earlier in the discussion of the object clause, these are all very negative terms. The word 
“threat” suggests a serious danger. “Dehydration” and, even more so, “starvation” connotes 
severe suffering. Because of that connotation, it is impossible to argue against it. Physicians 
cannot defend their proposal to stop artificial nutrition in terms of “I favor starving your 
mother”.  What needs to be determined in any given case is whether such a withdrawal of the 
AN&H does indeed equate to starvation as that process is commonly understood.  If it is, it is 
necessarily immoral. But if it is not, it may well be a moral course. To simply label it as a 
form of starvation begs the question.  The same is true when the text of the HCA next 
contrasts the alleged threat with “this standard of humane care.”  If administration of AN&H 
is indeed “humane care” in all circumstances, one is ethically obligated to provide it. But 
whether in fact it is always humane, is exactly what is at stake.  
Part 1: The Main Provision 
 The main part of the HCA is contained in the first sentence. This lengthy 
sentence itself consists of four parts: 
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[1.1] “The fundamental human right to food and water should not be denied to 
any person… 
[1.2] No [caregiver] … may refuse, deny, or fail to provide food and water 
sustenance and nourishment,  
[1.3] however delivered, …  
[1.4] if death or grave physical harm could reasonably result from such 
withholding and the person at risk can metabolize.” [numbers added] 
Part [1.1] casts the provision of food and water in rights language and assigns each 
Nebraskan a right to these goods. This raises the question whether Nebraskans currently do 
not have such a right.  In fact, they already do. The existence of such a right is evidenced by 
various other laws, such as the “Rights of the Terminally Ill Act”. This Act, which regulates 
living wills, in Section 20-408 stipulates that these regulations “…shall not affect the 
responsibility of the attending physician or other health care provider to provide treatment, 
including nutrition and hydration, for a patient's comfort care or alleviation of pain.” Even 
more explicitly, Section 30-3426 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes insists that “[a power of 
attorney document will not impact a patient’s]… right to …the usual and typical provision of 
nutrition and hydration.”  
The authors of the HCA could counter that the amendment wishes to underscore that 
this right to food and water is a “fundamental” right. But that language raises more questions 
than it answers. Most importantly, the wording would imply that every human person has this 
right and not just terminally ill patients. Given that many millions of US citizens suffer from 
chronic hunger, one could argue that this amendment tasks the state to make available much 
needed nutrition and hydration for them, even though this was most surely not intended by 
the drafters of the HCA. 
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More troublesome is the amendment’s limiting itself to food and water as stipulated 
twice in both [1.1] and [1.2].  Why this limitation? Why, for example, are patients not given a 
right to oxygen?  Chemically, oxygen is as much needed as carbohydrates. One cannot 
metabolize carbohydrates without oxygen. And it would be unconvincing to argue that 
suffocation from lack of oxygen is more “humane” than starvation. Along similar lines, one 
has to wonder why dialysis is not included.  From a biological perspective, equally important 
as the uptake of nutrients is the removal of toxic waste from the body.   
More troublesome yet are the methods of delivery mentioned in part [1.3].  In effect, 
the HCA does not specify appropriate methods of delivering nutrition and hydration, but 
mandates that care givers use any method available (“…, however delivered, …”).  This 
would suggest that not only common china and silverware are to be used to assist patients 
who cannot eat themselves, but also intravenous lines and tubes, in short, medical means of 
administration. Moreover, the HCA does not rule out the use of a funnel either, nor the use of 
force or restraints when patients object to the caregivers’ feeding efforts. Yet, if patients with 
Alzheimer’s dementia are confused by the feeding tube and continue to pull it out it, it would 
seem less humane to strap them down for the remainder of their days than to allow nutritional 
deficiencies to occur. 
Part [1.4] spells out the conditions under which AN&H must be administered.  This 
part of the sentence contains three Boolean connectors (IF, AND, OR), leading to the 
following break-down (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1 
                       PITFALLS OF LEGAL REGULATIONS                                                       11 
 
The Online Journal of Health Ethics Volume 6, No. 1 July, 2010 
 
 
This break-down makes clear that a necessary condition of legally mandated nutrition 
is the person’s ability to metabolize. But what does “metabolize” mean?  When used in the 
context of biology, as it is here, to metabolize means to “process chemically”.  
Metabolization is an ongoing process in every cell of the human body.  Parts of the human 
body, such as the skin, continue to metabolize even after the person’s death. This would lead 
to the conclusion that even if the person is dying, when all organ systems are shutting down 
and the body is itself resisting more food and water intake, but is still metabolizing, the 
patient must be force-fed. One can only wonder whether the drafters of the HCA intended 
that conclusion. Ultimately the problem is linguistic. Trying to capture the complexity of 
human dying in a single term inevitably will lead to dangerous simplifications. 
In addition to the patient still metabolizing, the HCA demands that one of two other 
conditions be met.  The first of these is that “death could reasonably result from such 
withholding …” This stipulation is odd because artificial nutrition and hydration is only 
indicated when patients cannot eat or be fed orally; not feeding these patients will inevitably 
result in their death.  Remarkably, the HCA does not say: “…if death could reasonably result 
sooner from such withholding…” So a patient who has three weeks left to live with or 
without AN&H must still be force-fed. At least, the federal Baby Doe Amendment from 
1985, which was intended to protect severely disabled newborns from medical abandonment, 
only requires the administration of “appropriate” nutrition and hydration, which “in the 
treating physician’s (or physicians’) reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be 
effective in ameliorating or correcting all such [life-threatening] conditions” (45 C.F.R. § 
1340.15 Services and treatment for disabled infants; Moss, 1987). No such provision is 
included in Nebraska’s HCA. 
Alternatively, food and water must be administered “if ... grave physical harm could 
…result from such withholding.”  The amendment, thus, is only concerned with harm that 
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may happen if food and water is not given.  It is not concerned with what harm may happen if 
food and water is given. The HCA reflects – and appeals to – commonly held fears of dying 
from dehydration and starvation.  It is these fears that make hunger strikes powerful political 
instruments.  But the HCA fails to acknowledge that many patients who are dying no longer 
desire food or water, and choose to severely limit or altogether forego their food intake, 
reporting no lasting sense of hunger (Winter, 2000). This makes sense because the dying 
body biologically no longer has much use of new nutrients.  It is even uncertain that 
terminally ill patients will live longer if they are fed artificially; no improvement in survival 
has been found so far in either patients with advanced cancer or those with advanced 
dementia (Gillick, 2000; Garrow et al 2007; Hallenbach, 2002; Mitchell, 2007). 
The HCA furthermore fails to take into account the harms that can result from 
forcefully administering food and water. These range from discomfort from the feeding tubes 
and lines, to abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting, particularly in the case of intestinal 
obstructions. By now, it has also become clear that artificial nutrition, particularly in patients 
with advanced Alzheimer’s dementia, places the patient at a significant risk of pneumonia 
(food pumped into the intestinal system makes its way from the stomach back up the 
esophagus and the down the trachea into the lungs); thus, the artificial nutrition may actually 
shorten patients’ lives. Forced administration of fluids, likewise, can be harmful.  A fluid 
overload can result in swelling of legs, abdomen and other body parts; in extreme situations 
the body may try to get rid of the unneeded fluids by weeping through the skin. The extra 
fluid can also induce congestive heart failure and difficulty breathing from water retained in 
the lungs.  In effect, the patient may end up drowning (Casarett, Kapo & Caplan 2005; Cervo, 
Bryan & Farber, 2006; Geppert, Andrews,&  Druyan, 2010;  Mitchell, 2007). It is difficult to 
see how such a death can be considered humane.  
Part 3: The Patient’s Will 
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The third part is intended to grant a legal way out to those who wish not to be treated 
as described above. It allows health care providers to honor: 
the will of any person who  
[3.1] by means of a valid advance directive record,  
[3.2] has fully, expressly, and personally  
[3.3a] either authorized the withholding of food or water from himself or herself 
under specific conditions,  
[3.3b] or delegated that decision, under specific conditions, to one or more relatives 
or to another person unrelated to the entity with a legal duty of care [numbers 
added].  
This section appears to provide those unwilling to be force-fed ample opportunities 
for making their wishes known. But on closer inspection, patients’ choices are actually quite 
limited. The HCA could have simply stated what is contained in [3.3a] and nothing more. 
This would still have been a digression from standard medical ethics and law. For a patient 
does not have to authorize the forgoing of treatment before it may be stopped; rather, the 
patient must consent to treatment before it can be initiated or continued. But at least it would 
not have limited the means by which patients can withhold their consent. Instead, the HCA in 
[3.1] specifies exactly how a patient can do so, namely by means of an advance directive 
record (AD).  There are two kinds of ADs: living wills (in which the patient provides consent 
to medical treatment – or withholds such consent – in advance of becoming incompetent), 
and power of attorney documents (in which the patient authorizes another person to provide a 
substitute consent – or withhold it – in advance of becoming incompetent). The manner in 
which Part 3 is phrased makes clear that [3.3a] and [3.3b] are the two advance directives 
already listed in [3.1].   
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When a law specifically states which methods can be used to refuse artificial nutrition 
and hydration, other methods are thereby disallowed.  For if the legislators had intended to 
allow other methods of refusal as well, they would have included those in the list of approved 
means. This is the same as a mother telling her son that he may color the side-walk using 
chalk or water paint. If she had not listed any methods, all methods would have been 
potentially admissible. But by listing only two methods of coloring, spray paint and all other 
methods were thereby excluded. Likewise, the HCA, by specifically listing ADs as the means 
of expressing one’s refusal of treatment, thereby excluded all other methods.  
The consequences of this exclusion are troubling.  For it means that only people who 
have issued an AD – a mere one-third of Nebraska’s population according to the latest 
statistics (Nebraska Coalition for Compassionate Care, 2004; Nebraska Hospice and 
Palliative Care Partnership, 2007) – may be spared the kinds of suffering described above if 
they end up suffering from Alzheimer’s dementia and are force-fed. And they would only be 
spared such fate if they happen to have addressed artificial nutrition and hydration 
specifically in their AD, as required by the applicable Nebraska statutes. Furthermore, people 
who never were able to issue an AD are always going to be force-fed.  This includes patients 
who are minors or who have been incompetent from birth because of mental disability.  For 
the HCA does not allow parents, guardians, or other proxies to make decisions regarding 
artificial nutrition and hydration on behalf of these vulnerable patient populations.  Finally, 
one has to wonder what the rights of competent adults are under the HCA.  An AD only takes 
effect once the patient becomes incompetent. It would appear that the authors of the HCA 
even wanted to curtail the right of competent adults to withhold consent for these medical 
interventions.  
It is quite remarkable that this kind of curtailment of individual rights had any chance 
of passing in the State of Nebraska (Furlong, 2007). Many of the 137,000 signers of the 
                       PITFALLS OF LEGAL REGULATIONS                                                       15 
 
The Online Journal of Health Ethics Volume 6, No. 1 July, 2010 
 
 
petition may not have realized what the HCA’s implications actually were and might have 
been shocked to learn what they just signed in favor of.  Indeed, the question arises who was 
behind the petition drive. As mentioned, the petition was formally initiated by a group called 
“Nebraskans for Humane Care Committee.” But who were the members of this new group 
that appeared to have been created solely for the purposes of this amendment? 
The Origins and Fate of the Amendment 
Nebraska is home to two medical centers (one of which is Catholic), each with 
medical, dental, nursing, pharmacy and health sciences schools, as well as units specifically 
dedicated to the study of health care ethics and policy.  But as it turned out, as far as this 
author could determine, none of their departments or faculty members were involved in this 
initiative or even consulted. Neither were professors in the state’s two law schools. Nor were 
any of the state’s professional organizations, including the Nebraska Hospice and Palliative 
Care Partnership, which has significantly improved humane end-of-life care in the state. If no 
academic and no health care institution or association was behind or even consulted in the 
drafting of the HCA, was it maybe initiated by a faith-based organization?  Given Pope John 
Paul II’s 2004 address and subsequent statements from Roman Catholic authorities such as 
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (2007), confirming the Pope’s statement that 
nutrition and hydration in principle must always be administered using advanced medical 
technologies if necessary (Bradley 2009), maybe the HCA originated at the Nebraska 
Catholic Conference's Pro Life Office? But the HCA did it not originate there either; the 
Office wasn’t even consulted but simply presented with a fait accompli: The amendment was 
ready to go, and the bishops were merely given the choice to be either in favor or against the 
initiative (Aksamit, 2006). 
If apparently no known entity inside of the State of Nebraska was the driving force 
behind this initiative, where did it originate? Attorney Thomas Mann, the sole identified in-
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state representative of the Nebraskans for Humane Care Committee, consistently refused to 
answer questions. Inquiries left on the NHCC electronic contact form, likewise, were met 
with deafening silence. This experience was shared by any and all Nebraskans who were 
concerned about the HCA and trying to find out who was behind the initiative and why. 
The only published accounts on the origins of the HCA appear to be the research 
undertaken by Hart Williams (2006), who published his findings on his website, and by 
journalists Nichole Aksamit and Paul Goodsell (2006) of the Omaha World Herald (OWH) 
newspaper. Based on these two sources, it appears that the amendment was drafted by several 
out-of-state lawyers, including Steven Safranek (who at the time was a professor of law at the 
Catholic Ave Maria University in Michigan), and Wesley Smith (a lawyer from California 
who has written extensively about end-of-life care from a Catholic perspective). Smith has 
confirmed his involvement in the drafting process in a 2006 blog (Smith, 2006). When 
interviewed by the OWH journalists, both of these legal scholars insisted that the amendment 
was not conceived by them, and neither appeared to know exactly where it originated and 
why this initiative was targeted at the State of Nebraska. As argued above, state law already 
acknowledges the right of Nebraskans to receive nutrition and hydration when medically 
indicated. 
Using publicly available campaign statements, made available by the Nebraska 
Accountability and Disclosure Committee (2006), both Williams and the OWH journalists 
followed the money trail, seeking to uncover who had financed the document preparation and 
the collection of the more than 137,000 signatures. The fact that large sums of money are 
donated to advance a particular moral view on end-of-life care through political means in and 
of itself is not unusual.  Eisenberg (2005) has traced the funds that enabled the family of Terri 
Schiavo to protract their legal fight for many years. Conversely, the recent 58%-42% vote in 
favor of legalizing physician assisted suicide in the State of Washington (Washington 
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Secretary of State, 2009) may have been the result of advocates’ access to $4.3 million 
whereas opponents had to make do with only $1.6 million in funds raised (Public Disclosure 
Commission, 2009). What renders the Nebraska situation rather unusual are the geographical 
locations of the financiers and their apparent lack of interest in the HCA itself. 
Williams and the OWH journalists discovered that all of the funds were funneled to 
Nebraska via an organization called “America at Its Best,” which is located in the State of 
Montana. Mr. Laird Maxwell of Boise, Idaho, who heads this organization, explained to the 
OWH journalists that the amendment was not his idea, but pitched to him. Nor did he know 
why Nebraska. In fact, he appeared not to even know attorney Thomas Mann, the single 
identified Nebraskan involved whose name was on the petition as the official contact person.  
Since “America at Its Best” only funneled the funds, the source had to be elsewhere. 
The OWH traced the money back to various donors in two more states, Virginia and New 
York. But the bulk of the funds ($835,000) turned out to be donated by “Americans for 
Limited Government” (ALG), located in Chicago, Illinois. Paradoxically, this organization’s 
principle purpose is to reduce the size of federal, state and local governments across the 
nation. Its president, John Tillman, insisted that ALG did not have a specific position on the 
issue of artificial nutrition and hydration; indeed, he had not even read the amendment 
(Aksamit & Goodsell, 2006). Likewise, Mr. Eric O'Keefe, chairman of ALG's Executive 
Committee, explained that the ALG had donated funds to support two amendments, the HCA 
and the proposal to cap state spending (“Stop Over Spending Nebraska”); how to allocate the 
donated funds between these two proposals was left to their Nebraskan allies.  Then again, 
Mr. O’Keefe must have known more than he was ready to admit. For it was his own wife, 
Ms. Leslie Graves, who started “Renewal Voter Outreach,” the Wisconsin based company 
that was paid $1.4 million to gather signatures for the two Nebraska petitions (Aksamit & 
Goodsell, 2006). 
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As mentioned, some 137,000 signatures were collected in the summer of 2006.  
However, the collection was subsequently contested by the State of Nebraska, which had 
reason to believe that a significant number of the signatures were not valid such that the HCA 
did not meet the level of support required by Nebraska law (Gale, 2006). A constitutional 
amendment requires signatures of 10% of the total number of voters who have registered for 
the upcoming general election at which the proposed measure will appear on the ballot. In 
addition, the signatures must represent at least 40% of Nebraska's 93 counties, and in each of 
those counties, signatures must equal at least 5% of the registered voters. The measure was, 
therefore, not placed on the ballot for the November 2006 elections. Court proceedings 
ensued and dragged out over more than a year. Finally in March of 2008, the NHCC decided 
to withdraw its opposition to the State’s refusal to accept all 137,000 signatures. The NHCC 
officially dissolved on February 4, 2008 (Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure 
Committee, 2008). Why the NHCC did so after spending so much money and fighting such a 
protracted battle remains unclear, though lack of further out-of-state funding appears to have 
been a consideration (Deputy for Elections, Office of the Nebraska Secretary of State, 
personal communication, March 7, 2008). 
Lessons to be Learned 
Throughout the history of medicine, those concerned about medical-ethical issues 
have attempted to regulate the behavior of physicians through the power of law.  With the 
rather sudden and dramatic increase in medicine’s effectiveness over the course of the 20th 
century, raising even more ethical questions and quandaries, such attempts at legal regulation 
have increased significantly. Some of these laws have successfully protected public interests. 
Notable examples are laws on the licensure of health care providers, laws requiring prompt 
reporting of highly infectious illnesses, and those regulating the testing of new drugs. But 
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many laws attempting to regulate medical practice, and likewise jurisprudential interventions, 
have failed to yield truly satisfactory results.  
Among the root causes of this failure is the evident fact that the vast majority of 
lawyers have neither studied nor practiced medicine or another health care field. 
Consequently, they have limited familiarity with the complexities of medical care and health 
care systems, the process of medical decision making, the challenge of diagnosing and 
treating under conditions of fundamental and inevitable uncertainties, and the nature of the 
therapeutic relationship.  The reverse is true as well. Health professionals’ knowledge about 
the law and legal thinking tends to be very limited. Many either base their decisions on faulty 
legal knowledge and exaggerated malpractice fears, or they mistakenly believe that the law 
can yield quick solutions for medicine’s thorny normative dilemmas.  The aforementioned 
problems are further compounded when lay people who attended neither medical nor law 
school, such as most legislators or (in the case of a public referendum) the public at large, 
attempt to regulate medical practice with legal instruments.  
The former problems are real but not insurmountable for they are practical in nature. 
More interdisciplinary courses for medical and law students, and similar continuing education 
offerings for practitioners in both professions would be a first step in the right direction. 
There is, however, a more foundational problem that concerns the very nature of these 
respective practices.   
The practice of medicine, though informed by scientific data which enjoy a certain 
degree of objectivity and universal applicability, ultimately is an art. Health care is about 
caring for individual patients who are unique.  They need treatments and care plans that are 
tailored to their particular physical and mental constitutions, their peculiar medical histories, 
their subjective experiences and expectations. Thus, medical care is largely a matter of trial 
and error, of experimenting and waiting, of adjusting and revising. 
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Law, on the other hand, is about universal principles and rules that apply to all people.  
It is about non-discrimination, fairness, and equal rights. Nobody can be charged unless there 
already exists a codified rule. And although jurisprudential interventions tend to focus on 
individual cases, there are strict rules for interpreting and applying the rules of law to 
individual cases. 
This admittedly overstated comparison between medicine and law underscores how 
difficult it is to craft legal answers to medical problems, whether legislative or 
jurisprudential. Consider, for example, the issue of precedent. Whenever a particular case is 
decided, the court must always bear in mind that its decision in this case will and must have 
an impact on similar such cases that may arise in the future, including those that will be 
decided by different courts. In contrast, a physician trying to figure out how best to treat Mr. 
X does not have to worry how this decision may impact the treatment of future patients. And 
while physicians should learn from the successes and failures of past treatments, whether 
their own or those performed by other physicians, fairness does not demand that future 
patients are treated with the same drug or surgical intervention as past patients were. 
These differences between medicine and law explain, at least in part, why the bulk of 
codified health law on, for example, end-of-life care only concerns patient decision making 
rights (e.g., informed consent, record access, confidentiality, and advance directives). There 
are laws on how to make decisions, who shall make decisions, and other such procedural 
aspects, but little to nothing on what is a good decision. The really hard, substantive 
questions, such as when to forgo further life-sustaining treatment, the admissibility of high 
and potentially life-threatening doses of pain killers, the use of terminal sedation, and the 
practice of euthanasia are rarely regulated by the law – or if so, in a very dissatisfactory 
manner (Ten Have & Welie, 2005). 
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When attempts are made to resolve complex medical-ethical quandaries by legal 
means, there is a risk of one of two dangers.  If an attempt is made to require certain medical 
interventions, as happened in the Nebraska Humane Care Amendment, there is the risk of 
forcing physicians and other health professionals to provide these treatments even if they do 
more harm than good in individual cases.  The records from the case of Sheila Pouliot reveal 
that many physicians continued to intervene medically in ways that they decried as being 
severely harmful to the patient, solely because of legal mandates (Ouellette 2004).  The same 
is true, though in the reverse, for laws that prohibit medical interventions.  The regulations by 
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that place stiff penalties on physicians who prescribe, 
pharmacists who provide narcotics, and nurses who administer in the absence of sound 
medical evidence justifying those drugs has also contributed to the undertreatment of dying 
patients who are suffering needlessly, even though the real risk of DEA action may be quite 
small (Brower 2009; Garrison & Mitty, 2010; Hellman, 2008; Quill & Meier, 2006; Jung & 
Reidenberg, 2006). 
But it is also precarious if legal regulations completely abstain from any substantive 
guidelines, remaining limited to procedures only. The Dutch legalization of euthanasia is a 
case in point. In order for euthanizing physicians to be immune from prosecution, they have 
to report their cases to one of five review committees.  Although these committees are 
required by law to assess each case using a set of substantive criteria, the only legally 
required source of information the committees have on which to base their assessments is 
what the euthanizing physicians themselves decide to report.  If a physician reports the 
suffering was unbearable and the patient’s wish was free and persistent, the committee has 
few grounds for questioning that judgment, which in turn explains why it takes these 
committees, on average, only five minutes per case to complete the kind of assessment that 
prior to the 2001 decriminalization used to take a full-blown prosecutorial investigation and 
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one or more court hearings, typically followed by at least one appeal to a higher court (Ten 
Have & Welie, 2005).  
It is a folly to consider law and lawyers mere roadblocks to medical progress, or 
worse, the enemy of clinicians. It is equally misguided to expect legal solutions for normative 
quandaries that are intrinsic to the practice of medicine itself.  In the fourth century BC, 
Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics already warned that one should not expect from a 
particular discipline more clarity, precision, or certainty than the subject admits (Aristotle, 
1925).  This is true of medicine. But so it is of law.  Whether, when, and how long medical 
treatment, be it resuscitation, narcotics, or artificial nutrition, is indicated for any particular 
terminally ill patient is ultimately a medical question, not a legal one. Medical scientists who 
develop and apply ever more advanced life-sustaining and life-altering interventions, together 
with the patients who will undergo them, must also tackle the normative questions about their 
proper use, instead of simply delegating that responsibility to legislatures and courts. 
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